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Introduction 
Empowerment and accountability have long been 
part of the international development vocabulary 
and a core part of governance, social development 
and civil society programmes. Yet, much of what 
has been learnt about these approaches has been 
drawn from studies in somewhat stable, open 
and middle-income places around the world. 
Less is known about how empowerment and 
accountability are achieved through social and 
political action in more difficult settings – those 
faced by institutional fragility, conflict, violence, 
and closing civic space.  
Learning these lessons is critical for policy makers 
and practitioners alike. Today, over two billion 
people live in countries affected by fragility, conflict 
and violence. According to the OECD (2018), without 
concerted action the share of the global poor 
living in such settings is projected to reach over 
80 per cent by 2030. To achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) of leaving no one 
behind, and in particular Goal 16 of promoting 
“peaceful and inclusive societies” and building 
“effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at 
all levels” new approaches will be needed. 
This document highlights key messages emerging 
from the work of the Action for Empowerment 
and Accountability Research Programme (A4EA), 
and the implications for how donors, policy 
makers and practitioners support strategies for 
empowerment and accountability in fragile, 
conflict and violence affected settings (FCVAS). 
Our eight key messages have strong implications 
for the theories of change used for effective 
programming in the field.
Taken together, the messages emerging from 
our findings pose important challenges to the 
received theories of change on empowerment 
and accountability used by donors and other 
external actors. The findings are also relevant 
for the effective implementation of a number 
of programmes dealing with gender equity, 
conflict and stability, strengthening civil society, 
and inclusive governance, particularly in fragile, 
conflict, and violence affected settings. In designing 
strategic interventions across sectors, it will be 
important for donors to keep these messages in 
mind. Equally, it is important for donors to see that 
they themselves are also actors in these settings, 
and that how they intervene can build or diminish 
trust, open or close spaces for engagement, or 
strengthen or weaken existing forms of authority.
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What is the A4EA Programme?
Funded by UK Aid from the Department for 
International Development (DFID), the A4EA Research 
Programme asks the question: How and under 
what conditions does social and political action 
contribute to empowerment and accountability 
in fragile, conflict, and violence affected settings 
(FCVAS)? During our first phase (2017-2018), 
we carried out over 15 research projects, with a 
particular focus on Egypt, Mozambique, Myanmar, 
Nigeria and Pakistan. The research projects were 
loosely organised under four themes: 
1 Meanings and expressions of empowerment and 
accountability – exploring the use of innovative 
methods such as governance diaries to examine 
how marginalised people relate to institutions 
in daily life, popular culture as forms of political 
expression, ‘unruly’ or unpredictable forms of 
protest actions as mechanisms of accountability, 
and religious meanings and identities for women’s 
empowerment in Muslim majority contexts. 
2 Pathways to accountability bargains – examining 
the effectiveness of various approaches to 
accountability work in settings often characterised 
by closing civic space, fragmented forms of 
authority, and informal mechanisms of power, 
including through political participation, judicial 
tribunals, information disclosure mechanisms, and 
social accountability programmes. 
3 Women’s social and political action – exploring 
the particular role of women’s action, including 
work on collective action to tackle sexual 
harassment, the #BringBackOurGirls movement 
in Nigeria, women’s political participation 
in Pakistan, and women’s representation in 
Mozambique. 
4 The role of external actors, particularly donors 
– focusing on the ways external donors support 
social and political actions for empowerment 
and accountability. Projects have explored the 
implementation of the World Bank’s citizen 
engagement policy, the role of adaptive 
programming and the challenges of working 
across scales in DFID programmes in FCVAS. 
Throughout the work, we have also paid special 
attention to methods of conducting and 
communicating research in FCVAS. Emerging 
findings offer important insights into understanding 
the contexts of FCVAS, the strategies and 
mechanisms of social and political action, and the 
role of external actors in reaching appropriate 
empowerment and accountability outcomes.
Our research has produced dozens of studies and 
communications products, which can be accessed 
through the A4EA webpage. 
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In FCVAS, factors like closing civic space, 
legacies of fear and distrust challenge 
fundamental assumptions about the conditions 
necessary for many processes of empowerment 
and accountability, which assume that ‘voice’ 
on the one hand and ‘responsiveness’ on the 
other will underpin the formation of a social 








In FCVAS, women’s collective action is an 
important driver of empowerment and 
accountability, through greater political 
empowerment in formal processes, as well 
as through more informal channels, social 
movements, and local actions which challenge 
gender norms.
Message 2
Theories of change often assume the existence 
of ‘accountable and responsive institutions’, 
towards which voice may be directed, but in 
FCVAS, we need to re-understand the nature 
of authority and question our assumptions of 
who is to be held to account, and by whom.
Message 6
Donors, policy makers and external actors 
can make important contributions in these 
settings, but more careful and grounded 
approaches are needed, with more 
appropriate expectations and measurements 
of outcomes.
Message 3
FCVAS are highly diverse, and constantly 
shifting. Opportunities for empowerment and 
accountability may present themselves at 
particular moments and in particular places, 
even while other places remain closed or 
difficult.
Message 7
Working in FCVAS requires an approach that is 
adaptive and flexible. This means giving frontline 
staff autonomy, recruiting entrepreneurial and 
politically savvy staff, and sometimes going 
against the grain.
Message 4
Even in difficult contexts, action for 
empowerment and accountability may be 
present, but not always in ways we see or 
recognise, implying different entry points 
for thinking and working politically, beyond 
business as usual.
Message 8
Understanding complex and highly political 
issues of empowerment and accountability 
in FCVAS requires new tools for political 
economy analysis and research that are 
sensitive to local dynamics, whilst also 
maintaining rigour.
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Key messages and their implications 
The role of fear  
In settings with long histories of authoritarianism 
and violence, internalised norms of fear shape 
the possibilities and nature of ‘voice’. Despite the 
creation or existence of formalised mechanisms 
for citizen engagement, citizens may hesitate to 
challenge authority in public ways. While this may 
be more extreme for marginalised groups, it also 
affects middle classes, who can often serve as allies 
for mobilisation and social and political action. 
A4EA research found: 
 • In Mozambique, many citizens are dependent on 
the dominant party for survival, making criticising 
it dangerous in terms of a risk to their livelihood. 
Even when information is available that informs 
citizens about corruption, for example through 
the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), this “new information may impose 
direct and indirect costs that far outweighs the 
expected benefits…this may include individual 
safety in taking rational action following new 
information” (Awortwi and Nuvunga 2019: 13). 
 • In Myanmar, governance diaries with marginalised 
groups also found that there is widespread fear 
amongst people of being disrespected or blamed 
by the authorities for any issues they raised. Due 
to previous negative experiences, many people did 
not dare approach village or ward administrators 
for fear of being shouted at, ridiculed or not 
taken seriously (A4EA forthcoming). 
Fear means that even where collective action is 
possible, it has to be carried out cautiously or in 
‘hidden’ ways. This can be due to a lack of security, 
where the state is unable to protect citizens, such 
as against the Boko Haram in Nigeria or the Taliban 
in Pakistan, or due to the overly heavy presence 
of the security apparatus, such as in Egypt, where 
spontaneous action is risky.
Fear and distrust are linked 
In each of the research settings, we also found 
extreme lack of trust, both between different 
groups in society, and in authorities. Fear and 
distrust are interlinked: the absence of trust in 
authorities means that citizens have little incentive 
to overcome fear to challenge them. Citizens may 
see little point in making demands of others, as 
they do not trust that things will change.
 • In Mozambique, our research into the impact of 
the EITI found that citizens do not believe that 
protesting or criticising the government will 
actually make a difference to their daily lives, 
so even if they are given information about 
corruption, for example, they choose not to 
act on it, as they don’t believe their action can 
change it (Awortwi and Nuvunga 2019: 20).
 • In Myanmar, our studies found that the extent 
to which marginalised groups engage with 
authorities to resolve issues is highly determined 
by both personal experiences and relationships, 
such as social kinship, shared ethno-linguistic 
background and other socio-economic factors., 
Generalised trust in political and state institutions 
is very low or absent (A4EA forthcoming).
 • This lack of trust does not just exist between 
citizens and the state, it also exists between 
different groups in society. Our Governance Diaries 
project found in Pakistan that it is difficult to 
collectivise in a context where there are extremely 
low levels of trust across and within groups.  
Fear and distrust are constantly being 
reinforced in changing/closing civic spaces
Even where democratic spaces are slowly opening, 
and where some signs of citizen agency emerge, fear 
can often be reinforced by constantly closing civic 
space. Civil society organisations and civic actors face: 
 • Physical harassment and intimidation, including 
threats, injuries and killings, impunity and lack of 
protection
 • Criminalisation: preventative measures such 
as terrorism lists and terrorism taskforces, 
investigation and prosecution for punitive purposes
 • Administrative red tape such as restrictive bills 
on NGO registration and operation, and ad hoc 
measures by different governments
Message 1
In FCVAS, factors like closing civic space, 
legacies of fear, and distrust challenge 
fundamental assumptions about the conditions 
necessary for many processes of empowerment 
and accountability, which assume that ‘voice’ 
on the one hand and ‘responsiveness’ on the 
other will underpin the formation of a social 
contract between citizens and the state. 
A note about the terms “Empowerment”, 
“Accountability” and “FCVAS”  
Terms like ‘empowerment’ and ‘accountability’ 
or ‘fragile, conflict and violence affected settings’ 
are widely used, but often have very different 
meanings. However, for our purposes, two points 
are particularly important: 
While often used together, empowerment and 
accountability are very different processes. 
Empowerment often refers to people having, or 
perceiving themselves to have, greater voice over 
decision making, an expanded range of choices 
and the possibilities of making them in the social, 
political and economic spheres, and increased 
control over their own lives (see Green 2016; 
Eyben 2011; DFID 2011). 
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the 
process of holding actors responsible for their 
actions (Schedler 1999; Fox 2007a; Joshi 2008). 
This involves ‘answerability’ — usually formal 
processes in which actions are held up to specific 
standards of behaviour or performance. For 
some this is sufficient to count as accountability, 
while others prefer a more rigorous minimum 
standard, including sanctions and/or remedies 
for transgressions. These two definitions can 
be described as ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ forms of 
accountability (Fox 2007b).
Our interest is in how collective forms of 
social and political action can contribute to 
both empowerment and accountability, and 
their interaction. Yet, as we have found in 
historical studies, “processes of accountability 
have to be distinguished from processes of 
empowerment and strengthening agency. 
Empowerment gains might be achieved without 
gaining accountability, and, (though less likely) 
institutional responsiveness might not lead to any 
empowerment” (Joshi 2019: 3).
In A4EA, we have chosen to use the term fragile, 
violence, conflict affected settings rather than 
states – preferring to focus on the specific 
characteristics of a defined area or affected group 
at a point in time.
As with empowerment and accountability, while 
these terms are often grouped together, fragility, 
conflict, and violence are each, of course, 
different and should not be used inter-changeably, 
although there may be synergies between them 
in particular settings. All three are dynamic, 
and at times highly volatile. In A4EA, we adopt 
the OECD multidimensional understanding of 
fragility as including societal, political, economic, 
environmental and security aspects (OECD 2018: 
10). We also understand fragility to be along a 
continuum, and that it can be experienced in 
many settings, even in countries considered to be 
more stable.
In our first phase of research, A4EA focused on 
Egypt, Myanmar, Mozambique, Nigeria (primarily 
the northern states), and Pakistan. While these 
do not perhaps represent the most extreme 
examples of fragile, violence or conflict affected 
settings (such as Yemen or Afghanistan), each of 
the five countries in which we work experience 
some dimensions of fragility, as recognised by 
the OECD (2018: 84). Three of the countries – 
Pakistan, Nigeria and Myanmar – have been 
on every list of fragility published by the OECD 
since 2008. Each also has a long history of 
authoritarianism, as well as a relatively strong 
state security apparatus, which has affected 
the possibilities and experiences of civic action 
over time. We believe that insights from settings 
such as these may also help us understand 
social and political action for empowerment and 













E M P O W E R M E N T  A N D  A C C O U N TA B I L I T Y  I N  D I F F I C U LT  S E T T I N G S :  W H AT  A R E  W E  L E A R N I N G ? E M P O W E R M E N T  A N D  A C C O U N TA B I L I T Y  I N  D I F F I C U LT  S E T T I N G S :  W H AT  A R E  W E  L E A R N I N G ?
8 9
one another, or when they do respond, they do so 
in a way that increases fear and repression. 
When citizens do raise voices these are met with 
non-responsiveness due to lack of capacity or 
political will, or indeed met with repression. The 
result can be a weakening of already fragile social 
contracts. Strengthening empowerment from below 
without also addressing the ability or willingness of 
authorities to respond can inadvertently reinforce 
legacies of fear and distrust.  
 • In Nigeria, civil society actors viewed Commissions 
of Inquiry (CoIs) as an opportunity to help bring 
about peace and justice in the aftermath of 
violence. However, very few CoIs led to actual 
prosecutions. Civil society actors blamed the 
weakness of state institutions and informal 
politics and networks as major factors affecting 
the ways in which COIs have operated, as well as 
their outcomes (Oosterom and Sha 2019).    
Informal channels and sources of 
authority
Even when national or local level authorities are 
present, marginalised groups may confer authority 
and legitimacy on other actors who are seen as 
more effective and linked to their concerns.
 • In Mozambique, when there was little trust 
in local leaders, the communities themselves 
legitimised other actors. For instance, the 
community-based Mualadzi Development and 
Natural Resources Management Committee 
emerged as an alternative interlocutor to 
solve day-to-day problems of people in the 
community, including access to health and 
security services (Chaimite et al. forthcoming). 
 • In Myanmar, when local governance actors were 
seen as ‘one of us’, they were more likely to 
be approached by villagers with accountability 
requests or demands. Proximity, ethnicity and 
common history are important – people tended 
to go to others from the same village or ward, 
or someone with whom they grew up, and who 
was accessible locally (A4EA forthcoming). 
Implications
 ➤ In working with marginalised groups, it is 
important to carry out political economy analysis 
from below to better understand how institutions 
and authorities are perceived. This also 
means greater attention to “the politics of the 
governed” (Chatterjee 2004), focusing attention 
on how the marginalised and disempowered 
negotiate with the relatively powerful, build 
coalitions and alliances, and develop their own 
theories of power and political change to guide 
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 • Stigmatisation and negative labelling, including 
criminal and social stigmatisation of specific actors
 • “Space under pressure”, including through co-
optation and the closure of newly created space
(Hossain et al. 2018b: 14-15)
Implications
When programming for empowerment and 
accountability, it is critical that external actors 
understand how the legacies of fear and distrust 
affect the potential for citizen voice and agency, 
and how their own presence and intervention can 
affect trust. They need to: 
 ➤Develop programmes which provide 
opportunities to overcome fear, to rebuild 
confidence and trust. Small interventions which 
build on personalised relations of trust, create 
safe spaces for groups to come together, and 
for slowly engaging authorities are important 
for longer term and larger scale change and are 
important measures of success.
 ➤Open, protect and maintain spaces for agency 
and action. Programmes for empowerment and 
accountability which involve citizens taking risks 
by speaking truth to power also may need legal 
and human rights support, such as provided in 
the Human Rights Defenders Programme, or for 
women’s rights activists in other interventions. 
 ➤Use the ‘boomerang’ approach – work with 
activists in relatively safe spaces who can 
support and speak for those in more risky, unsafe 
spaces. For instance, in the #BringBackOurGirls 
movement in Nigeria, more elite groups in the 
capital campaigned on behalf of the families in 
Chibok town, who were less able to speak out 
(Aina et al. 2019). 
Taking a view from below
Rather than assume we understand the nature of 
authority in FCVAS, we need to understand more 
about the perspectives of those who we expect may 
be empowered to hold public authorities to account. 
In Mozambique, Pakistan and Myanmar, governance 
diaries with extremely marginalised groups provided 
a different view of which authorities were important, 
and how they were accessed, than we might 
otherwise expect (Loureiro et al. forthcoming).  
Authority is often highly fragmented – 
involving both state and non-state actors
In FCVAS, those who citizens see as having 
authority may involve both state and non-state 
actors, such as the militias and armed groups 
in Pakistan, Myanmar and northern Nigeria, or 
religious leaders in Myanmar. 
 • In Mozambique the terms ‘State’, ‘Party’, and 
‘Government’ are often used interchangeably. The 
local actors who are understood as having authority 
are generally village chiefs and ward secretaries, the 
latter playing a hybrid role which blends traditional 
and state authority (Chaimite et al. forthcoming). 
 • In Myanmar, people’s understanding of authority 
is shaped by fear, history and past experience, 
rather than by an up-to-date understanding of 
the official government structure. In some rural 
areas Village Administrators are largely viewed 
as being the local authority figure who can 
resolve disputes, despite a change in the law that 
removed their official status (A4EA forthcoming). 
 • In Pakistan, the governance chain is long, with 
several layers of (male) intermediaries brokering 
access to services between poor and marginalised 
households and public authorities. Quite often 
there are a multitude of intermediaries, with 
success being a matter of contacting the right one. 
 • The governance chain also includes transnational 
state and non-state actors. For instance, in the 
case of fuel subsidy reforms, which have sparked 
protest in each country studied, it has included 
transnational energy investors and multilateral 
financial institutions, which were fragmented 
and distant from the view of the protestors 
(Hossain et al. 2018a).    
Voice needs response but authorities 
may be distant, or lack the capacity or 
incentives for accountability 
The governance diaries in both Myanmar and 
Pakistan show that what we might think of as the 
state or other authorities are not as present nor 
as significant in peoples’ lives as is often assumed. 
Even if there are grievances, there may not be any 
authority with whom people are linked and who 
can respond, or authorities may be at conflict with 
Message 2
Theories of change often assume the existence 
of “accountable and responsive institutions”, 
towards which voice may be directed, but in 
FCVAS, we need to re-understand the nature 
of authority and question our assumptions of 
who is to be held to account, and by whom.
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to segment and fragment the initiative across 
several actors and entry points in lieu of going to 
scale with one large intervention that authorities 
can crack down on“ (Tadros forthcoming). 
Shifting entry points for action
Where action at the national level is difficult, sub-
national levels may provide important opportunities 
and entry points for action. At the same time, 
actions need to be able to shift scales and entry 
points, depending on where there are strong allies. 
 • Our study of DFID-funded empowerment and 
accountability programmes examines how local 
demands were taken to different tiers of authority 
and institutions to gain resolution or build a case 
for reform, with practitioners and activists 
actively trying to navigate around bottlenecks 
and resistance. (Anderson et al. forthcoming). 
 • Case studies also illustrated how joining up 
pro-reform actors across national and local 
geographies, particularly in civil society, but 
within authorities as well, provided some ground 
work that allowed them to navigate opening 
and closing opportunities for progressive change 
(Christie and Green 2018). 
 • In other cases, such as in Mozambique, it was 
important to spread horizontally, finding pockets 
of good practice and linking them up with 
others, producing spill over effects from one 
locality to another (Anderson et al. forthcoming). 
Implications
 ➤Donors can play an important role in protecting, 
opening, or preserving civil society space, 
but how this can be done, and with what 
consequences, depends on the nature of the 
regime in place and the capacities and needs of 
civil society in that setting.   
 ➤Because spaces rapidly open and close over time, 
policy actors need the ability to read or register 
small shifts in opportunities for social and political 
action, knowing when the door is opening, as 
well as when it is about to close. A historical and 
contextual perspective is important to assess the 
significance of current opportunities or setbacks. 
 ➤ In each setting, entry points need to be found 
which can create new models and cultures of 
accountability. Working with small ‘islands’ of 
agency and action, often in local or sub-national 
settings, and supporting their horizontal spread 
can be an important strategy. 
 ➤Working across levels then becomes important 
for smaller initiatives to have impact. This, 
however, requires clear strategies to work across 
levels simultaneously and not assuming that 
multiple local projects will in themselves generate 
a tipping point towards more accountable 
institutions. There also need to be deliberate 
strategies of building horizontal and vertical links, 
as well as support for champions ‘from above’.  
Message 4
Even in difficult contexts, action for empowerment 
and accountability may be present, but not 
always in ways we see or recognise, implying 
different entry points for thinking and working 
politically, beyond business as usual.
 • When it isn’t possible to work with or through 
the state or official channels, citizens may 
use informal or alternative channels to seek 
accountability. Research into the social contract 
and accountability pathways in Myanmar found 
that people were often self-reliant when it came 
to trying to resolve conflicts or issues due to a 
lack of trust in authorities to play this role. In such 
settings, the weakest and most vulnerable groups 
rely on intermediaries who are trusted to make 
their accountability claims (A4EA forthcoming).
 • Research on countering sexual harassment 
collectively in Egypt found that success needed 
to be judged differently from programmes that 
promote highly visible and public voice. In hostile 
environments, just surviving and retaining a low 
profile can be criteria of success (Hamada et al. 
forthcoming). 
Alternative forms of political engagement
Even when there are formal institutional channels 
for voice and accountability, citizens may use more 
informal ways of expression, such as through 
popular culture as a media for political voice.
 • In Mozambique, a study on information disclosure 
showed that grassroots citizens were rarely using 
information from formal sources to hold extractives 
to account (Awortwi and Nuvunga 2019). Yet at 
the same time, a study of hip hop lyrics in popular 
culture showed a great deal of popular awareness 
and critique of corruption and governance. These 
songs are able to articulate a culture of fear that 
prevents people from criticising the government 
and the lyrics use moral judgement, ridicule 
and humour as alternative forms of political 
engagement (Manhiça et al. forthcoming).  
 ➤ In FCVAS, it is also important to work both sides 
of the equation to strengthen the opportunities 
for voice and action from below, but also to build 
the capacity of institutions to respond. Voice 
without response can risk weakening fragile 
trust; top down policies that aren’t informed by 
citizen voice and action may simply consolidate 
unfair power structures.
 ➤Understanding informal channels and sources of 
authority is critical to understanding how power 
works, and poses dilemmas for practitioners. 
Understanding local context also means 
understanding cultural and social norms around 
authority, and the role of religious, military, traditional 
or other authorities. Whose authority and capacity is 
to be strengthened, and whose accountability counts? 
Message 3
FCVAS are highly diverse and constantly 
shifting. Opportunities for empowerment 
and accountability may present themselves at 
particular moments and in particular places, even 
while other places remain closed or difficult.
Challenges of closing space
While there is growing attention to the challenges 
of closing space for civil society, it is critical to 
understand the different drivers for this in political-
economic settings, and their impacts.  
 • As Hossain et al. (2018b: 7) find, “civic space 
may be conceptualised not as closing or 
shrinking overall, but as changing, in terms of 
who participates and on what terms.”
 • The impact of closing or changing civic space for 
development outcomes will vary according to 
whether states are more developmental or more 
predatory, or whether authority is more competitive 
or more singularly dominant. The nature of civil 
society space will vary across these, but it is the ‘fit’ 
between state, civil society and market actors which 
will affect whether civil society is able to “engage 
with and hold state, political and economic actors to 
account for inclusive development policies (whether 
in process or outcome)” (Hossain et al. 2018b: 35). 
Civic space is not static 
Civic space is opening and closing constantly, affecting 
entry points for voice and citizen engagement, as 
well as broader spaces for reform and change.
 • A study of five historical examples of movements 
for accountability, finds that the dynamic nature 
of the context is constraining but also “can 
simultaneously offer opportunities for civic actors 
to form coalitions with new actors and movements 
that enable some traction… However, such 
coalitions by their nature are tricky and constantly 
in flux; and point to the staggered, non-linear nature 
of progress — where gains can be made as well as 
lost within a short period of time” (Joshi 2019: 3).   
 • Even in the same country, there will be multiple 
sub-national variations of context, and these will 
constantly shift and change. There may be areas 
that are in conflict, and others that are largely 
peaceful. In some areas the state is strong, 
yet weaker in others. For instance, in areas 
of conflict and violence, such as in northern 
parts of Nigeria, social and political action may 
be difficult. But in more stable nearby urban 
areas, the presence of groups with less fear and 
higher access to resources and social networks 
may mean that allied social and political action 
can occur, such as in the #BringBackOurGirls 
movement in Nigeria (Aina et al. 2019).  
 • In Pakistan, conflict in one part of the country, 
and deeply patriarchal gendered norms in tribal 
areas, did not stop empowerment successes 
for women at the legislative level. However, 
this took sustained effort over many years, 
and navigating different levels of political 
commitment to women’s inclusion under 
different governments and through different 
forms of mobilisation (Khan and Naqvi 2018). 
 • In Egypt, even as the space for citizen voice 
was closing in the streets through protests, 
campaigners for accountability against sexual 
harassment were able to find other spaces for 
engagement, taking a multi-prong approach. As 
pointed out by one researcher “…in a volatile 
environment, it is much better for external actors 
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Representation and legitimacy are key 
issues
While women’s social and political action is important, 
significant issues remain around representation 
and legitimacy.
In Pakistan, Mozambique and Egypt, women’s 
collective action has involved heterogeneous groups 
coming together, which has strengthened their 
mobilisation, but also brought tensions in terms of 
power relations and issues of representation.
 • For example, in Mozambique, while national 
level women’s NGOs may be effective in securing 
policy changes, in emphasising their relation 
with local and public authorities and less with 
the people they supposedly represented, they 
had difficulty in maintaining their legitimacy with 
their constituencies (Taela forthcoming). 
 • Evidence from Bangladesh, Nigeria, Egypt and 
Pakistan shows women mobilising around land 
rights, health, education, and workers’ rights. They 
are not necessarily mobilising under either feminist 
or religious banners, but around community 
issues. However, labelling these women activists 
as feminists in these settings, as is sometimes 
done by the press or by Western donors, can 
inadvertently give support to nationalist and 
fundamentalist agendas of anti-women’s rights 
groups who seek to delegitimise local women’s 
rights movements (Tadros and Khan 2019). 
Implications
 ➤ Programmes for gender equality and for the 
empowerment of women and girls provide 
important entry points for building skills 
of empowerment and accountability, even 
in difficult settings. These approaches are 
important for holding policies and policy makers 
to account on issues of gender equality and 
women’s rights.  
 ➤ Programmes for empowerment and 
accountability need, however, to address issues 
of gender norms, not only with women and girls, 
but with men and with broader institutions. 
In Pakistan, working with the male-dominated 
political parties, as well as with the men in 
the households, was important to ensure that 
women were recruited to vote, and supported at 
home to do so. 
 ➤ The language used to support women’s 
empowerment is important to each context. It is 
important to avoid ‘binaries’ when talking about 
women’s movements. Mobilisations may not be 
under ‘feminist’ or ‘religious’ banners, but around 
specific community issues affecting women. 
 ➤As with other civil society organisations, to have 
lasting impact, women’s organisations need to 
not only hold authorities to account, but also 
build structures and processes for their own 
legitimacy with their grassroots constituencies.  
Spontaneous and unruly action
When there isn’t a clear institutional channel 
for accountability, citizens engage in episodic 
and spontaneous action, like protests. These can 
become more coherent movements and grow 
beyond their initial mandate.
 • In Myanmar, Egypt, Mozambique and Nigeria, 
protests on energy prices were amplified and 
scaled-up from local or national economic conditions, 
into a bigger political challenge. In Mozambique 
and Nigeria, this involved significant disruption to 
the economy and to everyday urban life. In Pakistan, 
energy protests had visibly shaped the electoral 
contest that followed, and the implications for 
policy thereafter (Hossain et al. 2018a).
 • The Bring Back Our Girls (BBOG) movement 
in Nigeria grew out of an initial hashtag 
#BringBackOurGirls and a one-off protest in Abuja 
in April 2014, into a national movement that has 
consistently campaigned to hold the government 
to account in returning the kidnapped schoolgirls. 
BBOG later extended its mandate to several other 
issues such as safe schools, a missing persons 
audit, and soldiers’ welfare (Aina et al. 2019). 
 • In Guatemala, the youth-led anti-corruption 
protests in 2015, which started under the banner 
of the hashtag #RenunciaYa in Guatemala City, 
spread to other major urban areas, ultimately 
leading to the resignation of the President 
and Vice President. The campaign evolved 
from one “that targeted individual politicians 
(#RenunciaYa) to one that began to grapple with 
the breadth and depth of corruption in state 
institutions (#JusticiaYa),” though this momentum 
proved difficult to sustain (Flores 2019: 37). 
Implications
 ➤ Contextual mapping and political economy 
analysis needs to search for where the social 
energy is around political and governance issues, 
and start by understanding those spaces, not 
where we think the energy ought to be.   
 ➤Donors and policy actors need to broaden 
the understanding of ‘voice’ – and look for 
its multiple forms, not just those that appear 
through established channels or formal 
mechanisms for accountability. 
 ➤ Contentious episodes of action are important 
signals for change. We need to understand the 
ways in which large scale, and unruly protests 
contribute to empowerment and accountability.
The importance of women’s movements
Movements such as BBOG can be an important 
form of strengthening political empowerment and 
for demanding accountability on issues affecting 
women and girls.
 • The Nigerian women-led BBOG movement was 
established to demand government action for 
achieving the release of 276 secondary school 
girls who had been abducted by Boko Haram 
from Chibok, Northeast Nigeria in April 2014. The 
movement has achieved the release of around 160 
of the girls, the establishment of a national missing 
person’s register, and has created a rupture in the 
complacency in which violence against women is 
seen. It cuts across generations, gender, ethnicity 
and religions (Aina et al. 2019). While starting 
as a demand for security and accountability, 
the movement also led to empowerment of its 
members with new skills, organisation and voice. 
 • In Pakistan, historically, the drive for supporting 
women’s representation in politics has combined 
street level women’s activism with support from 
internal champions for reform at key moments. 
Once women appeared in large numbers 
in assemblies, they were able to promote 
progressive legislation affecting large numbers 
of women (Khan and Naqvi 2018). 
Challenging gender norms
Challenging gender norms with both men and 
women can contribute greatly to women’s political 
participation and important policy reforms.
 • In Pakistan, weak ties between political parties 
and women has gendered political spaces with 
very low levels of electoral participation by 
women. However, a women voters’ mobilisation 
campaign was successful at increasing women’s 
turnout by 8 per cent at the household level, 
but only when this campaign involved men and 
motivated them to act as enablers for women to 
vote on election day (Cheema et al. 2019). 
 • Where women have entered the legislature, they 
have contributed to important gains in policies 
for women, inclusion and gender equality (Khan 
and Naqvi 2018). 
Message 5
In FCVAS, women’s collective action is an important 
driver of empowerment and accountability, 
through greater political empowerment in 
formal processes, as well as through more 
informal channels, social movements, and local 
actions which challenge gender norms.
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and limitations in the evidence base to really 
analyse this question (Anderson et al. forthcoming).
 • Across the programmes, our research suggests 
the need for much more careful monitoring 
and evaluation of the relationships between 
empowerment and accountability outcomes 
and a wider frame of reference for what people 
experience as empowering or improving 
accountability in these kinds of settings. In the DFID 
programmes studied, there was very little focus on 
monitoring and evaluating empowerment, such 
as changes in individuals’ agency or capacities to 
organise and raise voice, yet these may be lacking 
in FCVAS settings, and are critical to achieving 
accountability (Anderson et al. forthcoming).
Implications
 ➤ Think carefully about the impacts of outside 
funding on emerging movements. Our research 
suggests a number of lessons for working in a 
low key or less risky way, including lessons on 
branding and framing, working closely with 
partners to assess risk, addressing the less 
contentious but enabling issues, supporting 
coalitions rather than single actors, and working 
on a “multitude of smalls” instead of one large 
high-profile initiative (Tadros forthcoming). 
 ➤ Strengthen civil society and governance actors 
to use policy levers which do exist, such as the 
World Bank Citizen Engagement policies. Join 
up and work across donor programmes for 
empowerment and accountability, both within 
single donors, and with others. 
 ➤ Foster more cross-programme learning within 
existing DFID programmes for empowerment and 
accountability. Empowerment and accountability 
initiatives may sit within separate departments, 
whether health and service delivery, governance, or 
economic development, yet they rarely communicate 
within one country, let alone across countries. 
 ➤ Focus on and measure the development 
of changes in the enabling conditions for 
accountability, and include these as key 
outcomes. Overcoming fear, changing social 
norms, sowing seeds of empowerment and 
accountability through small initiatives, may all 
produce intermediate level outcomes which are 
building blocks for longer term change. Think of 
accountability as a continuum, moving across 
such factors as empowerment – responsiveness 
– signalling – lack of impunity – answerability – 
accountability, and measure changes across the 
continuum, appropriate to local context.   
The text for this message is extracted from the report 
of the A4EA study on ‘Adaptive Programming’ by 
Angela Christie and Duncan Green (2019) ‘The Case 
for an Adaptive Approach to Empowerment and 
Accountability Programming in Fragile Settings’. 
The study involved three case studies of large DFID 
governance projects in Myanmar, Nigeria and Tanzania.
FCVAS are messy and ambiguous contexts in which 
to plan and implement development initiatives. 
To work there, external actors are increasingly 
adopting an adaptive approach to empowerment 
and accountability programming, whatever the 
setting. This means using a compass rather than a 
map, where real-time political economy analysis 
in relation to context and programme monitoring 
and evidence-informed learning in relation to 
intervention are used in combination and in shorter-
than-usual planning cycles to maintain and adapt 
strategic direction. (Christie and Green 2019)
Outside funding can be a double-edged 
sword in FCVAS settings
Outside funding can sometimes threaten the 
legitimacy of local movements, or lead to unexpected 
forms of backlash and protest.
 • For instance, in Nigeria, the BBOG refused external 
funding to protect itself from being accused of 
being an intervention by outside donors (Aina et 
al. 2019). On the other hand, research in Pakistan 
found that donor support was critical to building an 
effective women’s movement over time. Positive 
policy outcomes for women are strongly linked with 
the increase in women’s voices in elected bodies, 
however, additional factors such as party commitment 
and donor/international support also need to be in 
place (Khan and Naqvi 2018; Khan 2018). 
 • In Mozambique, women’s movements have often 
prioritised accountability to donors at the expense 
of building legitimacy with grassroots (Taela 
forthcoming). In the work on fuel-related protests, 
reform agendas promoted by external actors such 
as the International Monetary Fund can play a 
significant role in sparking political struggles and 
action around energy. External actors need to be 
more aware of the risks and other implications of 
their reforms, which requires far closer attention 
to the political economy dynamics of fossil fuel 
subsidies and energy, and to design their reform 
agendas with these in mind (Hossain et al. 2018a). 
Supporting citizen action for accountability
In some instances, donor mandates and initiatives for 
transparency and citizen engagement are present, but 
support is needed to convert these into citizen action 
for accountability.
 • A study of the World Bank’s ‘Framework for 
Mainstreaming Citizen Engagement Strategy’ in 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan, 
identifies the ways in which projects commit to 
integrating citizen engagement mechanisms and 
activities into project design and monitoring, yet 
we know very little about whether and how these 
mechanisms are actually utilised in practice during 
project implementation. Even among projects 
that document a range of citizen engagement 
commitments, few provide specifics on how they 
plan to carry these out. The study finds “there is 
greater emphasis on “reporting up” to World Bank 
management rather than “reporting out” to the 
public at large, even when projects commit to third-
party monitoring and implementing mechanisms 
for collecting citizen feedback and grievance 
redress” (Nadelman, Le and Sah 2019: 9-10).  
 • In these World Bank Citizen Engagement 
programmes, while 91 per cent of the projects 
studied proposed a project-specific grievance 
redress mechanism as a form of citizen 
engagement, only 22 per cent included a 
monitoring indicator dedicated to measuring the 
process or its results (Nadelman, Le and Sah 2019). 
 • The study of information disclosure through EITI in 
Mozambique found that while information existed, it 
was rarely used for public action to hold the extractive 
industries accountable. Our research identified 
some 18 intermediate variables that exist in the 
long chain from information disclosure to achieving 
accountability (Awortwi and Nuvunga 2019).  
In both of these cases, important global initiatives or 
policies have created frameworks and information 
which could potentially be used for action towards 
accountability, but large gaps remain between the 
potential and the reality of how these are taken up.
Exploiting wider learning
 • In each country we studied, DFID has also supported 
large scale empowerment and accountability 
programmes. They often report positive outcomes 
within specific sectors and their programme 
timeframes. However, the wider learning that could 
be gained from them, and their combined effects in 
specific contexts, is not fully exploited.
 • DFID-funded programmes in Mozambique, 
Myanmar and Pakistan shared similar logics and 
repertoires; they all involved elements of civic 
education, supporting civic space and environments 
for accountability, and establishing ways to channel 
people’s experiences and demands to power-holders.
 • The discrete, separate nature of these programmes 
and the incentives to show particular results in five-
year timeframes mean that their contribution to the 
evidence base is limited. They measure their impact 
differently, and largely by impacts on national 
policy, rather than empowerment or accountability 
outcomes themselves. There is a desire amongst 
practitioners and programme designers to learn what 













Donors, policy makers and external actors can 
make important contributions in these settings, 
but more careful and grounded approaches are 
needed, with more appropriate expectations 
and measurements of outcomes.
Message 7
Working in FCVAS requires an approach 
that is adaptive and flexible. This means 
giving front line staff autonomy, recruiting 
entrepreneurial and politically savvy staff, 
and sometimes going against the grain.
E M P O W E R M E N T  A N D  A C C O U N TA B I L I T Y  I N  D I F F I C U LT  S E T T I N G S :  W H AT  A R E  W E  L E A R N I N G ? E M P O W E R M E N T  A N D  A C C O U N TA B I L I T Y  I N  D I F F I C U LT  S E T T I N G S :  W H AT  A R E  W E  L E A R N I N G ?
16 17
contrast with the normal big, slow procedures 
of aid allows adaptive programmes both to build 
trust and to seize windows of opportunity.
 ➤ Communicate to build trust: Building, 
maintaining and repairing trust between 
all the different people in the jigsaw is an 
exhausting and never-ending process of 
constant communication, especially important 
in fragile settings where tensions can run high. 
Communications are also about stamina, being 
prepared to start from scratch with every new 
arrival (particularly the case with donors, which 
often have a much higher level of staff turnover 
than programmes, especially frontline staff).
Message 8
Understanding complex and highly political 
issues of empowerment and accountability in 
FCVAS requires new tools for political economy 
analysis and research that are sensitive to local 
dynamics, whilst also maintaining rigour.
Deepening approaches to political 
economy analysis
Consistent with the wider debates on thinking and 
working politically, our research shows the need 
to deepen the standard institutional approach 
to political economy analysis in FCVAS – bringing 
in the importance of norms, emotions (fear), 
cultural expression, gender relations, and informal 
institutions that shape politics and the exercise of 
power in FCVAS. 
 • The governance diaries approach used in 
Mozambique, Myanmar and Pakistan is a 
promising and innovative way to understand 
from below how marginalised groups engage 
with and perceive authority (Loureiro et al. 
forthcoming).  
 • Other projects, such as our research in Mozambique 
on expressions of citizen voices through music, 
demonstrate the importance of cultural expressions 
as signals of political feeling, grievances, and 
conflict (Green 2018; Manhiça et al. forthcoming). 
 • Religious understandings, as well as 
understanding of the role of religious 
authorities, are also important, but need to 
be careful not to be read through a Western 
lens. Governance diaries gave a view of the 
importance of religious authorities in Myanmar, 
while the work by scholars on how gender 
equality is interpreted through Islam gave 
important insights into understanding gender 
norms and actions in these countries (Tadros 
and Khan 2019). 
 • Sporadic, contentious episodes or protests can 
also be used as barometers through which to 
understand popular discontent and how political 
regimes are understood from below, as seen 
in the work on fuel protests across multiple 
countries (Hossain et al. 2018a). 
Balancing rigour and risk
Researching complex and highly political issues 
of empowerment and accountability in FCVAS 
requires complex decisions to maintain rigour, 
whilst also minimising risk and overcoming 
constraints and limitations.
 • Good local knowledge and partners are 
fundamental; researchers need to work with 
them on making strategic decisions about 
complex contexts.
 • Not only civic space, but space for research is 
constantly opening and closing in these countries. 
There is a need for research programmes 
themselves to be adaptable and to shift their 
strategies in rapidly changing conditions.  
 • To research risky and difficult settings, while 
minimising risks to researchers and those 
with whom they conduct their research, is a 
challenging task. There is a need to understand 
the changing risks in given settings, and what 
kinds of questions and locations would put 
researchers at the lowest levels of risk, while 
still maintaining rigour and relevance. In some 
settings, it was important to conduct interviews 
‘under the radar’, and even then, research was 
not possible in some settings. 
Negotiating the route to research 
uptake in FCVAS
In some cases, research uptake through more 
traditional public channels may prove too risky, and 
alternative strategies may be needed.
 • In one setting, we discussed the considerable risk 
of publishing and locally disseminating research 
findings that would be deemed as being critical 
to the government. While the research project 
seemed feasible early on, local partners said, 
“Now, our entire field of operations could be 
shut down as a result of publishing our research 
findings [which would be considered as being 
Adaptive governance, adaptive 
programming and adaptive delivery are 
intertwined  
 • Adaptive Delivery is the daily, on-the-ground 
work undertaken by a delivery team, with their 
fingers on the social, political and economic 
pulse of the world in which they operate
 • Adaptive Programming is a slower and more 
structured process, usually in the hands of the 
senior team within the programme office and 
informed by frontline staff and the patterns 
and players that they are spotting or that are 
emerging from delivery, as well as the pressures 
from donors to deliver results
 • Adaptive Governance normally resides with the 
officer(s) in the donor agency responsible for 
funding the programme and following its progress
The relationship between adaptive delivery, 
programming and governance is constantly 
evolving, and can sometimes be fraught. Alignment 
and trust across the various players and tiers 
involved and confidence that the plan is realistic 
are critical to success.  
When to work with or against the grain
Adaptive approaches emphasise the importance 
of “working with the grain” of existing institutions 
rather than attempting to transplant ideas and 
institutions from elsewhere. But that approach 
requires treading a tightrope between engagement 
with local structures, and the programme’s 
commitment to transformational change. When 
government and citizen groups have competing 
priorities, how can a programme identify whose 
grain to go with? When is the existing grain so 
damaging to the interests of marginalised groups 
that ‘working against the grain’ should be the 
preferred response? This dilemma was particularly 
evident on issues of gender equity and inclusion 
in our case studies, where projects were often 
represented by men. 
Evolution not revolution 
Our case studies suggest that there is still 
considerable uncertainty over how to deliver 
programmes successfully in an adaptive way 
and if and how this new approach yields better 
development results. This is not a surprising finding. 
Evolution takes time and only a commitment to 
further trial and the space for further error, will tell 
us whether adaptive approaches offer a way to 
do development not only differently, but better in 
settings where fragility, conflict and violence have 
challenged other more traditional approaches.
Implications
 ➤Getting the people right is critical: Adaptive 
programmes need people who have the 
right attitude and soft skills to facilitate, 
influence, motivate and manage relationships 
with stakeholders, who are emotionally 
intelligent and show humility, but also have the 
entrepreneurial, risk-taking appetite and drive to 
seize opportunities and try out new ideas. Much 
more attention (and perhaps more research) is 
needed on how to recruit, incentivise and retain 
entrepreneurial spirits of the kind we saw in the 
three programmes.
 ➤ Small money can be beautiful: Small, agile 
pots of funding can kick-start a relationship, or 
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critical of the government], and local partners 
would be at personal risk.”  
 • In another setting, the situation was so 
sensitive during the presidential election that 
two think-pieces written by participants from 
that setting were anonymised and only shared 
amongst other workshop participants. 
 • In another setting, following an official 
clampdown on people associated with a 
new, emerging social movement, we did not 
photograph or tweet about the three study 
groups with women activists, to avoid drawing 
attention to the fact that they were conducting 
research. Care also had to be taken on social 
media outputs, which were being monitored by 
intelligence services, since mainstream media is 
forbidden from covering the social movement, 
and individuals have been picked up for 
questioning if they had posted sympathetically 
about related activism.
Communication as trust building
On the other hand, communicating and 
disseminating research in these settings may 
itself offer important steps for building trust and 
overcoming traumas of violence.
 • In some cases, simply bringing people together 
to discuss research processes or findings 
created important spaces for dialogue, which 
in themselves may have been rare in highly 
polarised, conflictual settings.
 • In settings where people are dealing with 
the effects of trauma, violence and conflict, 
research offers a potential place for challenge 
and for healing. For instance, during a feedback 
workshop on the findings of the BBOG 
movement in Nigeria, the workshop’s schedule 
had to be adjusted after the sharing of interim 
findings opened up a space for members 
to challenge both the language used by 
researchers and share the pain and hurt of their 
experiences, for example, where researchers 
used the term “physical harassment”, 
members present corrected them “I think you 
[researchers] are not aware of what happened; 
we were not just physically harassed – we were 
tear-gassed, arrested and detained”. During the 
workshop, sharing the research created a space 
for healing – many repeated their experiences, 
‘It was impossible to shut down or stop the 
overflow of words and emotions’ wrote one 
participant (Oluwajulugbe 2018). 
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